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Abstract 
This  paper  provides  a   comprehensive  overview   of  corporate   governance  (CG) developments in 
Greece and  has  two objectives: to enrich  the debate in this area  and  to contribute to the increasing 
literature by presenting the main aspects of the Greek CG framework; and to place the current CG 
developments and  trends in Greece within the international debate, especially in the light of the recent  
debate to improve  and  convergence CG in the EU. 
First,  reviews  the  evolution  of the  CG  debate  in Greece and  its implication at the EU level. Second, 
provides a short view of the institutional-economic environment in Greece, as it influences corporate 
governance practices. Then analyzes the CG mechanisms in the light of the recent key reforms.  Finally, 
summarizes the findings  and  proceeds with some critical points  and  recommendations. 
The  general  finding  is  that  the  development  of  regulatory  reforms  was   mostly  an endogenous 
process influenced mainly by the speculative events in the Greek  capital  market  during 
1999. 
The evolution of the Greek CG may have  significant implication,  such as that the Greek  market  is a newly 
mature  euro-area market and CG is supposed to be  a key factor  for the competitive transformation of 
the capital  market  and  the business world. In addition, the evolutionary path  of CG in Greece may have  
significant  implication  for the new EU member states. 
The paper shows  how the CG practices evolve in a small open economy influenced by speculative events 
and  is valuable to policymakers, regulators and  academics. 
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Introduction  
 
The  upgrading  of  the  Greek   capital   market   to  mature  market   status and  the  global competition 
for capital  has  boosted the corporate governance (CG) debate in Greece. In addition,  the  recent 
corporate failures  and   financial  scandals  around the  world  have increase awareness that  proper 
CG  is  fundamental to  the  efficient  operation of capital markets.  The  Greek   economy  sustained its  
high  growth  rate,  despite the  international  economic  slowdown,  while  the  Olympic  Games of  2004  
put  the  Greek   market   in  the international   spotlight  and   will   likely  invite  interest  from  foreign  
investors.  Market transparency and  investors’  confidence is perhaps the  greatest CG challenge facing  
the Greek  capital  market.  This paper provides a comprehensive overview of CG developments in 
Greece and  has  two objectives. Firstly, I intend  to enrich the debate in this area  and  to contribute to the 
increasing body  of literature  by presenting the main aspects of the Greek CG framework.  Secondly, I aim 
to place the current  CG developments and trends in Greece within  the   international   debate,  
especially in  the   light  of  the   discussions  about  the coordination of the efforts taken  by and  within 
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member states to improve and  converge CG in EU.  The  structure of the  paper is  similar  to  a  recent 
paper  published on  Corporate Governance by Melsa  Ararat and  Mehmet  Ugur. The authors provided 
an overview  of the Turkish CG framework  given  the  increased interest  in CG  matter  and  the  
significance of Turkey as  an  emerging market  (Ararat  and  Ugur,  2003).  In my paper the overview  of 
the Greek CG may have significant  implication as the Greek market is a newly mature euro-area market  
and  CG is supposed to be  a  key  factor  for the  competitive transformation of the capital  market  and  
the business world. In addition, the evolutionary  path  of CG in Greece may have  significant  implication 
for the new EU member states direction  in this area. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly presents the CG debate and  
highlights  the  major trends in the  EU. The second section presents the  main aspects of  CG  in  
Greece and   focuses on  the  recent  developments. The  last  section summarizes the findings  and  
proceeds with some critical points  and  recommendations for the potential  future direction  of the CG 
agenda in Greece. 
 
 
Corporate governance: key issues and  the reform agenda 
 
Corporate governance: definition and  agency problems 
 
CG  has  been a  widely  discussed issue  among academics, capital  markets’  regulators, international  
organizations and the business world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), define CG as the way in which the 
suppliers of finance  to corporation assure adequate returns on their investments. Agency theory is the 
fundamental reference in CG. The agency problems vary, depending on the  ownership characteristics of 
each country.  In countries with dispersed ownership structure (mainly the USA and  the UK) the 
separation of ownership and  control, as   posed  by  Berle  and   Means   (1932),   refers   to  the  inherent   
conflicting   interests  of opportunistic managers and  owners  (Fama  and  Jensen, 1983; Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Williamson  1985).   Investors  usually   use   their  exit  options   if   they   disagree  with  the 
management or if they are disappointed by the company’s performance, signaling – through share  prices  
reduction  –  the   necessity  for   managers  to  improve   firm  performance (Hirschman, 1970).  On the 
other  hand, in countries with concentrated ownership structure (continental Europe, Japan and other 
OECD countries), large dominant shareholders usually control managers and  expropriate minority 
shareholders, in order  to extract  private  control benefits. The agency problem  of CG is therefore posed as 
how to align the interests of strong blockholders and  weak minority shareholders (Becht,  1997). 
 
CG  has   significant   implications  for  the  growth  prospects of  an  economy.  Proper   CG practices 
diminish  risk  for  investors, attract  investment capital  and  improve  corporate performance. 
Especially, in an  era  of increasing competition and  capital  mobility CG has become a  key  element 
affecting the  industrial  competitiveness of countries (Maher  and Andersson, 1999).  Moreover,  CG 
seems to affect  the  exchange rate  policy.  Castren and  Takalo  (2000)  suggest that  a  partial  reform  
of  CG  practices may  actually   render the exchange rate  peg vulnerable to speculative attack. In 
addition, Johnson et al. (2000) and  Mitton (1999) report how the weak CG worsened the 1997 Asian 
currency crises. 
 
Corporate governance: the EU debate and transformation process 
 
Recent events of corporate scandals and  failures,  mainly in the USA, have  raised serious questions 
about the way the public corporations are governed. Corporate governance (CG) reforms  have  been 
demanded around the world, even  if some countries face  more serious problems  than   others do  (Mayer,  
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2003).   In  the  USA,  the  American   Congress rapidly responded, by passing the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002.  The New York Stock  Exchange followed by adopting new rules for listed companies. These 
actions are supposed to be the most  significant  reform in the US CG since the creation of the country’s 
security regulation framework  in the 1930s  (Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe, 2003). 
 
The European Commission (EC) on May 2003 presented an action  plan on CG. The action plan closely 
follows the recommendations of the ‘‘High level group of company law experts’’ chaired by  Jaap Winter.  
The  experts’   Group   appointed  by  the  EC  in  order   to  make  recommendations on a modern regulatory 
framework in the EU for company law. The Group  addressed a number of issues related to CG and 
proceeded with a set of recommendations to the EC (European Commission, 2002).  Some  of the 
recommendations are suggested  to 
 
formulate  a European framework  rule or a Directive. Other recommendations, according to the Group,  
should  be  a member state decision. The key features of the action  plan  are: 
 
- requirement to publish  an annual  CG statement; 
 
- improving  the ability of shareholders to exercise the voting rights across countries; 
 
- setting   minimum   independence  requirements    for  the   formation   of   nomination, remuneration 
and  audit committees; 
- setting minimum requirements for director independence; 
 
- confirming   collective   responsibility  of  the  board for  financial  and   key  non-financial statements; 
- stiffening sanctions for board members (wrongful trading rule, directors disqualification, investigation 
by courts/regulators at instigation  of minority shareholders); and 
- studying the potential  for abuses by pyramidal groups. 
 
The above recommendations can  be  seen as  an  effort to design a sufficient  and flexible corporate 
governance framework in the EU. The increasing interest  to reconstruct CG arises also from the aspiration 
to create an integrated European capital  market  with common rules and  a  high  degree of transparency 
by  2005.  Hence, there  is pressure to harmonize the national regulatory frameworks and perhaps 
ultimately create a single  European market  for corporate  control  (European Shadow Financial  
Regulatory Committee, 2002;  Soderstrom et al., 2003). So far the competent US authorities have not 
recognized the relevant European standards as  ‘‘equivalent’’, and  have  started to impose their new 
rules, in particular  those enshrined  in  the   Sarbanes-Oxley  Act.  Many  questions   arise   regarding  
the   potential  relationship of the EU and  US system: Should  EU push for international  standards and  hope 
for mutual recognition? How easy is it for the EU countries to follow a single  model?  The EU countries 
face   major  issues  where  consensus  cannot easily  reached. Significant  legal differences remain 
among member states. To a great extent,  theses differences are the ones most deeply grounded in 
national  attitudes and  cultures, and  hence, the  most  difficult to unify. The CG structures are shaped 
according to the special needs and priorities of each country.  Hence, any  attempt to homogenize and  
regulate CG  practices, which,  by  their nature, present great degree of heterogeneity across countries, 
activity and time, may not be the best policy (Mayer, 2003). It is worthwhile also to mention that the 
European Commission (2002) clearly states that the adoption of an EU CG code would not achieve full 
information for investors and it would not contribute significantly to the improvement of CG in Europe. 
 
The economic  environment in Greece 
 
The entrance of Greece in the Eurozone in January 2001 marked the start of a new era for the country.  One 
4 
 
should, however,  be reminded that Greece industrialized in the early post-war years and  experienced 
stagnation and  significant  structural problems for two decades until the mid-1990s. The Greek  economy, 
after a long period of fiscal and  monetary imbalances, has improved steadily over the last 8 years, as the 
government has tightened policy with the goal  of achieving  fiscal  discipline and  price  stability.  The  
Stability  and  Growth  Pact[1] commits  Greece to  move  towards a  budgetary position  close to  
balance or  surplus  to prevent  budget deficits  from exceeding the 3 percent ceiling,  while the 
implementation of the  euro-area  monetary policy  by  the  European  Central  Bank (ECB)  results   on  
price  stability[2]. In 2003 the Greek economy continued to perform quite strongly. The GDP growth rate  for 
2003  is estimated to be  4  percent, well above the  European average. The  main driving forces of the 
economic activity was private consumption as well as private and public investment.  Investment 
spending  remained  linked  to  the  financial  flows  from  the  EU Structural  Funds, the accelerating 
preparations for the Olympics, along with strong  private investment. 
 
However, Foreign  Direct Investments (FDI) flows remain  low in comparison with the EU. FDI inwards  as  a 
percentage of gross fixed capital  formation  increased from 5.9 in 1985-1995 (annual  average) to 6.0  in 
2001.  However,  in 2002  FDI inwards in proportion to Greece’s gross fixed  capital  formation  dropped 
sharply  to 0.2.  At the  same time,  the  EU average 
 increased from 5 percent in 1985-1995 (annual  average) to 22.5 percent in 2002. Greece’s inward FDI 
Performance Index is below the composite index for the EU countries. The inward FDI Performance Index 
in Greece dropped sharply  from 1.27 in 1988-1990 (1.28 for the EU), to 0.1 in 1998-2000 (1.7 for the EU). 
Greece’s underperformance compared to the EU can be also  seen from the  FDI stock  inwards  relative  
to GDP.  The  FDI stock  inwards  in the  EU countries increased much  faster  compared to Greece. The 
EU’s FDI stock  inwards, as  a percentage of GDP, from 6.1 in 1980 reached 31.4 in 2002, while in Greece 
form 9.3 in 1980 dropped to 9.0 in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2002,  2003). 
 
Among  the  group of Mediterranean countries, Greece shows  the  second  lowest  level of estimated 
deterred FDI, in a range from 92 to 122 percent (with an Opacity Factor  of 57[3]). In dollar terms,  this 
would represent a gain  in the range of $1.01  to $1.34  billion, if Greece could  manage to reduce its 
opacity  to the benchmark (Transparency International, 2002, 
2003). The Opacity Index suggests that Greece can  benefit  from review of its governmental economic 
policy, and the transparency of its business regulatory regimen. To the degree that FDI is deterred and  
goes elsewhere, these two factors appear to be  among the causes. 
 
The  governmental policy,  as clearly  stated in the  Greek  Stability  and  Growth  Program submitted 
recently  to the  EU, is committed, among others, to step up  reform  efforts.  A number of structural 
reforms in product, capital  and  labor markets (e.g.  simplification of the tax system, continuation of the 
privatization of state owned  assets[4], reforms in the area of public  administration) will improve the 
functioning  of markets, the competitiveness of Greek firms, and  thus will enhance the productive 
capacity of the Greek  economy. 
 
The prospects for 2004-2006 are quite encouraging since the economic activity is expected to remain 
buoyant, unemployment is projected to further fall, and inflation is also expected to further decelerate, 
although it will remain at a level higher than the EU average. The Olympic Games that  will take  place in 
Athens  in 2004  are expected to have  significant  externality effects on the economy and particularly on 
the tourist sector for the coming  years. Moreover, as  many  projects that  are  co-financed by  the  EU 
Third Community  Support Framework  become more mature, they will result in higher  flows of funds  
from the EU that will help  to maintain   a  high   level  of  activity  mainly  in  the   construction sector.  
These  factors   in combination with the projected strong  private  consumption and investment can  
sustain a high level of economic activity over the next few years. 
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The corporate governance framework in Greece 
 
Traditionally  Greek  companies were,  and  most  of them  still remain,  family  owned. Family members 
were also  board members and  the company’s executives. This kind of structure did not give rise to 
thoughts on efficient CG as there  existed no agency problems between the owners  and  the 
management. However, the significant  use  of IPO’s as means for raising capital  in the late 1990s turned  
these companies from private-family  owned  to public  listed companies,  and offered  the  first sign  that  
the  long  lasting  operating methods had  to be reconsidered.  The  discussion on  CG  in  Greece is  
focused mainly  toward  protecting individual and  minority shareholders’ interests that are  practically 
cut off from the decision making   process of  the  firm.  CG  was   first  introduced in  Greece in  1998  
through  an introductory paper published by the Athens  Stock Exchange. A series of conferences and  
discussions led, then, to the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct in 1999 (initiated by the Hellenic 
Capital  Market Commission (HCMC) in collaboration with all relevant  agents in the Greek economy). In 
May 2002 the Ministry of the Economy amended the corporate law and incorporated  fundamental CG  
obligations[5].  Moreover,   the   University  of  Athens   has  recently  established a rating system for the 
listed companies in Greece based solely on CG criteria. The legislative  framework  of the Greek  capital 
market  is now fully harmonised with the  guidelines and  directives of the  EU.  Although  improvements in 
CG have  occurred in Greece, they are mainly confined to a small number of large  listed companies that 
are more in tune with the international  corporate stage. 
 
La Porta  et  al. (1998)  classified countries into legal  families  and  examined  whether  laws pertaining to 
investor protection differ across countries and  whether these differences have consequences for CG, by 
constructing different indices. Greece, a French  origin company 
 
law country,  was rated 2 out of 6 for the shareholders’ rights (lower compared both with the French  
family and  the total sample average[6]). Greece was also rated 7 out of 10 and  6.18 out of 10 for the  
efficiency  of the  judicial system and  the  rule of law respectively. In both indices Greece scored better 
than the average French legal family, but worse  than the total sample average.  Finally,  the  accounting  
standards  score of  55  out  of  90  in  Greece outperformed the  French family  and   underperformed 
the  total  sample average. These evidences suggest  that  French   civil law  countries, including   
Greece, afford  low  legal protection  to  shareholders,  especially  regarding  voting  by  mail  and   laws   
protecting oppressed minorities.  The results  also  suggest that Greece be  placed close to the  world 
average regarding the  quality  of law enforcement and  accounting  standards. Its  worth mentioning 
that Greece is rated worse than all the EU member states with respect to the rule of law and  accounting 
standards (excluding Portugal). 
 
However, the above rating results do not take into account the major structural reforms  that took  place 
after  1996  in the  Greek  capital  market.  New  regulations  have  been recently  introduced to restore 
pubic confidence, to protect  (minority)  shareholders’ rights  and  to improve CG mechanisms. Certain 
rules and laws mandate a number of CG standards for the listed companies in Greece (see Table I). 
 
Legal system overview 
 
Greek   companies are  governed by  Law  2190/1920. In  addition, listed  companies are governed  by   
Law  3016/2002.   The   general    meeting  of   shareholders  is  the   main decision-making organ  of the  
company and  has  exclusive competence  in key  areas[7]. The  shareholders’ right  of vote  in the  
general meeting corresponds  to  the  shares they possess. There  are two forms of shares, bearer and  
registered. In principle  all shares are equal, with an exception to the preference shares, which give 
some exceptional rights  to their owners[8]. 
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One-tier  board predominantly governs the listed companies in Greece, where shareholders directly  elect   
the  directors through   the  shareholder general  meeting. While  the  basic company law  (2190/1920) 
does  not  provide for  the  existence of  a  supervisory board controlling the management, the new law 
(3016/2002) solves  the management supervision issue. At least  1/3 of the total directors must be non-
executive, of which at least  two must be independent[9]. The liability of the managing director (equivalent 
to a chief executive officer) is much stricter  than  that of other senior  managers of board members. 
 
It is also  worthwhile to mention  the special characteristics of the state-owned companies. Until 1996, 
the stated-owned companies in Greece were operated under  a totally protective regime.  The 
government appointed the board of directors and  the top management. The main   corporate  goal   
departed   largely   from  profit  maximization.   Low  profits,   losses, underinvestment and   low  product 
quality  were  the  case in  most  Greek   stated-owned corporations.   Although   a   new   law  was   
enacted   in  1996,   mandating  state-owned corporations to operate like other  private  companies, there  
are  still many problems to be solved. CEO and board member selection is still not independent from 
political interventions 
 
 
Table I  Law and the quality of its enforcement (average ratings) 
 
 Shareholders’ 
rights  (0-6) 
Efficiency of the 
judicial system (0-10) 
Rule of 
law (0-10) 
Accounting 
standards (0-90) 
 
Greece 
 
2.00 
 
7.00 
 
6.18 
 
55.00 
French  origin 2.33 6.56 6.05 51.17 
English  origin 4.00 8.15 6.46 69.62 
German origin 2.33 8.54 8.68 62.67 
Scandinavian origin 3.00 10.00 10.00 74.00 
World 3.00 7.67 6.85 60.93 
Note:  Higher score indicates better rating 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
 
 
 
and  preferences, especially for listed companies where the dispersion of ownership is very low 
and  the  state is the  dominant shareholder. Contemporary  CG mechanisms have  not been 
introduced yet  (e.g.   board committees,  competent directors, performance-based 
compensation scheme), reducing international  investment attractiveness. 
 
The  Ministry  of  National   Economy  has   the  responsibility  to  monitor  and  analyze  the 
developments in the domestic and  foreign capital  markets, the processing and  formation of 
proposals of government policy on capital  markets issues, the harmonization of legislation with 
European law and  supervision of observance of the law by all agencies of the capital  market  
and  the Stock Exchange. 
 
The HCMC is the main independent regulatory decision-making body,  operating under  the 
supervision  of  the  Ministry  of  National  Economy.   The  HCMC  issues  statutory   rules  and  
regulations aiming at investor protection, the safeguarding of capital market’s normal operation, the 
improvement of market transparency, the enhancement of efficiency of the trading, clearing and 
settlement systems and the efficient operation of capital  market agencies and institutions. A central 
means for exercising prudential supervision of capital market entities by the HCMC is the license 
authorization function and  the  imposition  of fit and  proper EU standards for the granting  of 
licenses. In order  to ensure the smooth function of the capital  market,  the HCMC introduces  rules   
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and   regulations  and   supervises  compliance[10] with  them,   aiming  at safeguarding the normal 
and smooth  operation of market  systems and the establishment of appropriate  transparency 
standards  (disclosure of  information  on  financial  performance, market  transactions, ownership, 
structural changes, notification of corporate actions, etc.). 
 
Investor  service has  been decisively enhanced  by the creation of a new market institution: the  
Capital  Market  Ombudsman. The main  objective of the  new  institution  is the  friendly 
settlement and  mutual  resolution  of disputes occurring between individual investor-clients and 
market intermediaries that fall into the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, in a just and unbiased manner 
and  through  transparent and  concise procedures. 
 
The  Athens   Stock   Exchange  (ASE)  was   founded  in  1876   as   a  self-regulated  public 
institution.  In 1995,  the  ASE was  transformed into  a  Societe Anonyme.  In March  2000 
Hellenic Exchange SA, a fully privatized company, was established as a holding company of the  
ASE. Currently,  five different  markets operate under   the  ASE:  main  market;  parallel market; 
new market;  Greek  market  of emerging capital markets; and  secondary listings on ASE from 
stock exchanges outside Greece. For the issuing company to be listed on the main market,  it 
should  employ  own  funds  amounting to at  least  e11,738,811.45, while for the parallel market, 
the company should  employ own funds amounting to at least e2,934,702.86. 
 
The fundamental supervisory relations  governing the Greek  capital  market  are illustrated  in 
Figure 1. 
 
The developments of the capital market 
 
The Greek capital market has been transformed largely during the last four years.  New markets were  
established and  the HCMC completed a wide range  of institutional changes. HCMC’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  The fundamental supervisory relations  governing  the Greek  capital market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulatory activities were  mainly directed at the protection of investors, the enhancement of 
market  transparency, the protection of the systems of trading  and clearing, the enactment of 
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codes of conduct and the assurance of the smooth function of the capital  market. 
 
However,   the   Greek   capital   market   has   been  experiencing a   cycle   of   self-fulfilling 
expectations during  the second and  third quarters of 1999.  At the end of the year 1999 the ASE 
General Index realized  a total annual  increase of 102.2 percent. Due to the rise of share prices of 
listed companies the total ASE capitalization recorded an annual  increase of 194.7 percent (from 
e67,024.8 million in 1998 to e197,537 million in 1999), among the highest in the OECD countries. 
The total value of transactions increased from e41,708.1 million in 1998 to e173,027 million in 
1999,  realizing  an increase of 194.7  percent. An increasing number of companies raised funds  
through  the  capital  market.  The total funds  raised  through  initial public offerings (IPOs) 
amounted to e1,842.3 million in 1999 against e1,157.2 million in 1998 and e59.0 million in 1997, 
corresponding to an increase of 59.2 percent and 3,022.5  percent respectively. Listed  
companies raised e8,128.0 million in 1999,  an amount  that was  472.9 percent higher  than in 
the previous year (see Table II). 
 
The massive entrance of individual and  institutional investors in the capital market, mostly 
through   placements on  small-and-medium-capitalization stocks,  increased rapidly  both 
stock prices and  liquidity in the second and  third quarters of 1999.  Investors proceeded to 
short-term  speculative placements and  in a state of euphoria were  betted, in full certainty that 
stock prices would increase further. The cycle of self-fulfilling expectations resulted on a 
significant  divergence between actual prices and prices justified by corporate fundamentals 
(equilibrium  prices).  However,  the  manic  phase always  has  an  end.   The  Greek  capital  
market’s  severe  underperformance in  2000,   2001  and   2002  largely  resulted  from  the 
previous  speculative process. The ASE General Index realized  an annual decrease of 38.8 
percent in 2000,  23.5  percent in  2001  and  32.5  percent in  2002.  Both  the  total  value  of 
transactions and the ASE capitalization decreased. In 2002, the total values of transaction in the  
ASE  decreased by  38.9  percent  and 85.7  percent in  relation  to  2001  and   1999 
respectively. Total market capitalization during  2002 amounted to e65,759.7 million showing  a 
decrease of 47.4 percent and  66.7 percent in relation to 2001 and  1999 respectively. 
 
Throughout   history,  many   speculative   bubbles  took   place,   with  significant   social 
impacts[11]. The  group,  not  the  individual,  gives  birth  to a  speculative  bubble, making the 
task of improving judgment and  confidence more difficult. The speculative events in the Greek  
capital   market  during  1999  led  the  HCMC  and  the  state to  take  an  active  role, introducing 
rules, regulations and  codes of conduct. All these measures were aiming at the protection of 
investors against market  abuse, the improvement of the transparency of the market  and  the 
establishment of appropriate business ethics. 
 
 
Disclosure and transparency 
 
The disclosure framework  in Greece is quite strong  and  in line with the EU trends. A major 
contribution during  2000 to the enhancement of transparency and disclosure regarding the 
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Table II  The growth of the capital market  in Greece, 1997-2002 (amounts in million of euros) 
 
 
Value of transactions  Market capitalization 
 
Fund  raised through 
IPOs 
 
 
ASE general 
 
Year 
 
Amount 
Percentage 
change Amount 
Percentage 
change 
Percentage 
of GDP Amount 
Percentage 
change 
index (percentage 
change) 
 
1997  17,081.4 – 28,793.3 – 29.6  59.0  – 58.5 
1998  41,708.1 144.2  67,024.8 132.8  63.6  1,157.2  1,861.4  85.1 
1999  173,027.0 314.9  197,537.0 194.7  169.4  1,840.0  59.0  102.2 
2000  101,675.7 2 41.2  117,956.3 2 40.3  95.5  2,557.8  39.01  2 38.8 
2001  40,529.8 2 60.1  96,949.5 2 17.8  74.1  1,075.6  2 137.8  2 23.5 
2002  24,771.0 2 38.9  65,759.7 2 47.4  46.9  92.5  2 1,062.8  2 32.5 
Source: Athens  Stock Exchange, HCMC 
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behavior of listed companies in the Greek  capital  market  has  been the enactment of HCMC rule:  ‘‘A code 
of conduct for companies listed  in the  Athens  Stock  Exchange and  their affiliated  persons’’  (HCMC 
Rule 5/204/2000). The  code  sets  behavior standards for ASE listed  companies and  specifies duties 
and obligations of companies’ major shareholders, the members of the board of directors, the 
executive management or other  individuals  or legal entities relating to them. The aim is to eliminate 
uncertainty in the market  on corporate affairs and avoid  speculation by company insiders or other  
persons that may have  inside information. 
 
An important  element to the financial disclosure is the requirement for the listed companies to publish  an 
annual  report and a cash flow statement. The cash flow statement is structured along  international   
accounting standards and  constitutes  the  first step of implementing International Accounting 
Standards  (IAS) in  Greece (HCMC,  2000).  The  existence and  operation of an audit department is a 
prerequisite for the approval of initial public offering of company shares or  other  securities, while 
auditors are  obligated to  be  independent in performing  their responsibilities. In addition, investment 
firms are now most strictly obliged to prepare semi-annual and annual  financial statements, audited by 
certified auditors, which will be submitted to the HCMC within two months  of the end of the semester and 
the calendar year. 
 
Ownership structure and control 
 
Dispersion in Greece is considered as middle to low. According to the HCMC (2001), in 370 listed 
companies in Greece, average ownership dispersion was  47.22  percent when  the major  shareholder  
is  defined as   the  shareholder  owning  at  least   5  percent. In  total, according to the study, the 370 
listed companies were held by 974 major shareholders, while the  major  shareholders  per  listed  
company were  around  3.  The  results   indicate that competition for control at the company level is quite 
little. Large families usually control most of the  small-and-medium-sized companies and  members of 
the  controlling  families  are usually serving  as the top management. In addition, the state controls  large 
percentages of votes  in a significant  number of listed companies. Large capitalization firms display a 
more dispersed ownership and  control structure (ownership dispersion was 54.04  percent) than medium   
and   small  capitalization  firms.  Large   shareholders  may   act   as   an   effective monitoring  mechanism 
of management and,  thereby,  enhance firm performance. However, controlling blockholders can  use  their 
power  to extract  own private  benefits, at the expense of minority shareholders. This kind of expropriation 
leads to sub-optimal levels of investment by   minority.   Therefore,  the   agency  problem    arises as  a   
conflict   between  ‘‘strong blockholders and   weak  minority  owners’’,  rather  than  between ‘‘strong  
managers and  weak owners’’ (see Table III). 
 
The  high  degree of ownership concentration is consistent with the  results  in  most  other continental  
Europe   countries.  In  Italy,  Bianchi   et  al.  (1997)  showed  that   the   largest shareholder in listed 
companies held on average 48 percent of total voting rights, while the largest three  shareholders held 62 
percent. Bloch and  Kremp (2001) reported a significant  degree of concentration of ownership (56 
percent) for listed firms in France. A recent study  by  Faccio  and  Lang  (2000),  in a  sample of 3,740  
companies in five Western  European countries (France, Spain, Italy and UK) documented a small degree 
of ownership dispersion (38.3 percent of companies are widely held). 
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Table III  Ownership dispersion of the ASE-listed  companies 
 
 
 
ASE main 
 
ASE parallel 
 
New 
 
Total 
 
FTSE-20 
 
FTSE-40 
market market market market companies companies 
 
Ownership dispersion (%) 
 
48.74 
 
30.42 
 
25.05 
 
47.22 
 
54.04 
 
44.40 
Number  of major shareholdersa 653 317 4 974 52 101 
 
Capitalization  (millions of euros) 91,500 8,204 46 99,750 55,411 15,630 
Note:  Shareholders owning a stake of at least  5 percent of the company’s share capital 
Source: HCMC, Research Division (2001) 
 
 
 
Corporate governance actions: voluntary codes 
 
A number of financial scandals and  corporate failures in the 1980s  in the USA and the UK boosted the 
debate on how best to make managers accountable to shareholders. Corporate collapses such as 
Maxwell, BCCI and  Barings, and  vast executive compensation increases resulted in a variety of domestic 
and international  initiatives to restore public  confidence. These initiatives  consisted of  a  set  of 
voluntary  principles and  regulations on  corporate governance.  Increasing attention  in CG  is also  
associated by  the  common belief  that  a sound CG regime enhances market liquidity and efficiency. 
Institutional investors, according to the  investor  opinion  survey  released by McKinsey  & Company, are 
prepared to pay  a premium  for companies exhibiting  high governance standards[12] (McKinsey & 
Company, 
2002).  More than  60 percent of investors state that governance consideration might lead them to avoid 
individual companies with poor governance. 
 
The publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) introduced several new CG guidelines, while the initial 
impetus was given by the Principles and Recommendations of the American  Law Institute   and   the   
Treadway   Commission  (1987)   in  the   USA.  Moreover,   supranational authorities, like the OECD and  
the World Bank, developed a set of voluntary principles and recommendations driving the attention  for a 
minimum respect of basic CG rules worldwide.  These developments encouraged other  countries to look 
into the necessity of establishing relevant  voluntary CG codes. 
 
Throughout the  last  five years, many  countries have  established  various  regulations and  started  to  
review  their  company  law.  Discussions  focus   on  how  to  protect  minority shareholders, enhance 
transparency and disclosure of information, improve board functions  and  structures, limit the rule of anti-
take-over devices, and  improve  auditing  processes. In many cases, the new regulations and laws are 
based on the previously  developed voluntary CG codes. 
 
The  first major  step toward  the  formation  of a  comprehensive framework  on  corporate governance has  
been the publication of the Principles of Corporate Governance in Greece on October 1999 by an ad hoc 
committee (Committee on Corporate Governance in Greece (CCG) (1999)) co-ordinated by the HCMC. 
The voluntary CG code suggest that a ‘‘comply or explain’’ approach should  be adopted. 
 
The Greek  code contains 44 recommendations compiled on seven main categories: 
 
1.  The rights and  obligations of shareholders. 
 
2.  The equitable treatment of shareholders. 
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3.  The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
 
4.  Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing. 
 
5.  The board of directors; 
 
6.  The non-executive members of the board of directors. 
 
7.  Executive management. 
 
The  principles and  best practice rules  incorporated, were  closely  modeled  according to OECD  
Principles  of  Corporate  Governance  (OECD,  1999).   The  ‘‘comply  or  explain’’ approach forces the 
listed  companies to disclose the specific reasons explaining why the recommendations  have   not  been  
complied  with.  The  code refers   to  issues that  are mandatory in the  existing  regulatory  framework  
and  thus  the  compliance degree is very high.  Weak  compliance  appear, however,   in  issues that  are  
not  mandatory (a  detailed compliance analysis is presented in the next section). In 2001 the Athens  
Stock Exchange asked listed companies to provide compliance information based on a checklist 
(qualitative  criteria) in the spirit of the 1999 voluntary code and  has  recently  issued a list of ‘‘complying 
listed companies’’. As of March 2003 only 33 listed companies, of which around 50 percent represent high 
capitalization companies, have  adopted the ASE qualitative  criteria[13]. 
 
In  August   2001  the  Federation of  Greek   Industries (FGI)  introduced the  Principles of Corporate 
Governance for all companies, but  especially for the  companies listed  on the Athens   Stock   
Exchange.   Compliance  with  the   Principles    is  voluntary.   The   main recommendations include: 
 
B       the  establishment of board level committees consisting of a  majority of  non-executive directors; 
and 
B       the implementation of internal control by a specific department or individual. 
 
The FGI Principles do not address the issue  of equal/fair treatment of shareholders and  the rights of 
stakeholders. They do not also contain  any provisions dealing specifically with the protection of 
shareholders’ rights,  the ratio of non-executive directors, the compensation of non-executive directors and  
the separation between the CEO and  the board chair. 
 
 
Corporate governance rating and evaluation 
 
In a period of volatile and  uncertain markets, as shown by the recent corporate failures and  poor  
governance structures, demanding institutional investors seek to place their funds  in well-governed 
companies. Mainstream investors tend to examine and include  in their overall investment strategy whether  
companies comply with specific internationally  accepted CG standards. At the same time, as more  
investors evaluate CG when purchasing stocks and  mutual funds,  an increasing number of listed 
companies feel the pressure to take actions in order to adopt efficient CG policies  and practices. As a 
response to the increase in demand for CG  evaluations, some investment research firms  and  
academic  institutions  are  now developing  CG  rating   services.  A  corporate  governance  score is  
derived  mainly  by analyzing to what extent a company adopts codes and guidelines of generally 
accepted CG best practices, and  the  extent  to  which  local  laws,  regulations, and  market  conditions 
encourage or discourage corporate governance practices (Xanthakis  et al., 2003). 
 
A  quite   limited  number  of  studies  use   a  CG  index   in  order   to  investigate  whether  within-country  
variation  in  CG  affects firms’  market   value.  Black  (2001) examined  the relationship between CG 
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behavior and  market  value  for a sample of 21 Russian firms by using  CG  rankings developed  by  the  
Brunswick  Warburg   investment bank.  The  author  reported a powerful correlation between the market  
value and  CG of Russian firms. Durnev and Kim (2003) found that higher scores on both the CLSA CG 
index and the S&P disclosure and  transparency  index  predict higher  firm value  for a  sample of 859  
large  firms  in  27 countries. Gompers et al. (2001) showed the existence of a striking relationship between 
CG and  stock  returns.  The  authors used the  incidence of  24  different  provisions (primarily takeover 
deafness) to build a ‘‘governance index’’ and  then  they  studied the  relationship between this index  and  
firm’s performance. The ‘‘Governance Index’’ is highly correlated with firm value. Klapper  and  Love 
(2002)  used data on firm-level CG rankings across 14 emerging markets and  found  a  wide  variation  
in firm-level governance across  countries. Black et al. (2003)  constructed a multifactor  CG index  
based primarily on responses to a survey  of all listed companies by the Korea Stock  Exchange. They 
found a strong  positive  correlation between the overall CG index and firm market value, which is robust  
across OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regressions, in subsamples, in alternate specifications of the CG index, and  
with alternate measures of firm value. 
 
The Center  of Financial Studies in the Department of Economics of the University of Athens  launched a 
project  financed by the ASE aiming at a pilot CG rating (Tsipouri and  Xanthakis, 
2004;  Xanthakis  et al., 2003).  The target of the project  was  to apply  the rating system to a number of  
companies on  a  voluntary  basis and   to  quantify  the  compliance of  Greek companies with 
international  best practices (Tsipouri and Xanthakis,  2004). Specific  targets were: 
 
- to provide an independent and  reliable  tool for all investors who believe  that a thorough examination of 
CG practices will lead  to increased long-term shareholder value; 
- to  provide   a  comprehensive and   specific rating  regarding  all  CG  criteria  for  each company, 
enabling firms to use  their individual  results  in order  to measure themselves against several benchmarks 
(high, average, sectoral average); 
- to produce useful results of aggregated data for the relevant authorities (e.g. the ASE, the HCMC) and 
create an aggregate score for the Greek listed companies participating, thus demonstrating strengths and 
weaknesses to be taken into account for policy making; and 
- form a basis for comparison with future exercises and offer a tool that will allow correlation of the results with 
stock value and profitability to check the extent to which investors pay a premium  for companies with high 
ratings. 
The  listed  companies’ CG  practices were  assessed for the  year  2001  through  five main corporate  
governance  indicators, which  basically replicate the  structure of  the  OECD principles: 
 
(1)  The rights and  obligations of shareholders. 
 
(2)  Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing. (3)  The board of 
directors. 
(4)  Executive management. 
 
(5)  Corporate  governance  commitment, the  role  of  stakeholders and  corporate  social responsibility. 
 
The five main indicators were comprised of a total of 37 partial indicators. The final outcome was based 
on the answers, through face-to-face interviews,  of 120 listed companies which together represented 
more than 85 percent of the capitalization of the market[14]. One of the main  contributions of  the  project 
was  the  consensus that  resulted from  a  very  close collaboration between the ASE (which financed 
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the project  and  had  an interest  in practical results),   an  academic  research center (which  could   
guarantee the  methodology  and impartiality) and  representatives of the market  participants (who 
provided thorough inputs and  assured the practical value of the results)[15]. 
 
The total rating  results  demonstrated a relatively satisfactory outcome (70.4 points out of 
100).  Bigger  companies received the better average percentage score (79.7  out of 100), and  
compliance deteriorated as  firm size  decreased (71.5  and  67.9  out  of 100  for the medium  and  small 
capitalization companies respectively). The highest compliance in the Greek  market  is  in the  category 
of  shareholders’  rights,  followed  by  transparency and  CEO/Executive management. The board of 
directors category had  a medium  compliance score,  while  weak  compliance appeared  in  the  
category  that  incorporate factors  like commitment to CG, corporate social  responsibility and  the 
relations  with stakeholders. 
 
This  ranking  of the  CG  categories is  largely  influenced and  justified  by  the  impact   of mandatory 
provisions, which are concentrated in the categories with the highest compliance scores. Weaker  
compliance is observed in the  role of  stakeholders and  corporate social responsibility, the organization 
of CG, the effective  role of the independent members of the board (which could be attributed to 
companies with family control and small pool of potential  independent   board   members),  disclosure  of  
remuneration  (even   the   best   scoring companies declared this to be  a deliberate policy, in line with 
local norms  and  protecting their   executives  from  exposure)  and   risk   management  (only  banks   
and   insurance companies  have   taken   some  steps).  Cost   is  another reason  for  low  compliance  
in particular  for the smaller  companies. 
 
Only  very  few  of  the  companies we  rated are  internationally   quoted.  Some  more  are envisaging a 
dual  listing. For them,  the interest  does not lie in their comparison with other Greek companies or with 
basic OECD principles, but on their potential  to compete for funds  globally.   So   far   the   Greek   
legislation   cannot  ensure   satisfactory  compliance  with international   standards.  For  this  purpose, 
it  is  of  crucial   importance  to  increase  the number of indicators in  a  future  exercise to  comply  with 
international   advances on  the subject. 
The above evaluation and  rating  effort indicates that CG reform has  been posted as  a top priority in 
many  large  listed  companies. Pressure by demanding international  institutional investors is the  main  
driving  force  of the  compliance  process. However,  the  majority  of medium  and  small  capitalization  
(family-owned)  companies have  adopted the  minimum mandatory requirements and lack further efficient 
CG mechanisms. Such as the competition for capital  is increasing, the listed companies have to realize that 
proper CG is a prerequisite in order to attract international  capital. Moreover, corporate governance may 
meet one of the most  significant   challenges that  family-run  businesses  face:  management  
succession. Keeping a business going across generations is hard. Failure to maintain the family business 
can  stem  from any  number of causes.  Corporate governance goes to the  heart  of these problems. 
Families  need  corporate  governance  both   to  operate the  business and   to promote family  harmony  
(Zafft,  2003).  It is  also  worth  to  mention  that  the  Greek  listed companies do  not,  in general, use  CG  
rating  services. There  is  no  CG  rating  services provider operating locally, while the international  
companies (e.g.  S&P, Deminor) face  huge search and  other  costs to enter  the  Greek  market.  Of  course 
the  internationally  exposed (high-capitalization) companies regularly use special advisory  services in 
order  to evaluate and reform their CG structures. The smaller companies adapt a narrow ‘‘family’’ interest  
that poses obstacles to necessary changes (see Table IV). 
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Conclusions, discussion and  policy implications 
 
The Greek capital  market has been experiencing a large development during the last years. However,  the  
development path  has  been quite  volatile.  After the  cycle  of self-fulfilling expectations  during    the   
second  and   third   quarters   of   1999   and   the   severe underperformance in the  following years, 
investor  confidence has  been reduced. Listed companies alone were unable to restore public 
confidence. In this framework,  voluntary and  regulatory initiatives were proposed or adopted in response 
to external  and  internal forces, in order  to  restore public  confidence. The main  regulatory actions 
addressed  issues like corporate transparency, disclosure of information and independent auditing. In this 
way, it is hoped that  the  Greek  capital   market  will be  an  attractive investment  option  where  the 
(minority) shareholder rights are sufficiently protected and exercised. 
 
However,   the   majority   of  the   listed   companies  in  Greece  lack   sufficient   corporate governance 
mechanisms (CG). The ownership concentration of the listed companies is still high,  resulting  on strong  
ties  between the  main  shareholder and  the  management team. Family  firms  still dominate the  Greek  
capital   market.   Internationally   recognized board 
 
 
Table IV  The evolution of corporate governance in Greece 
 
Date  Corporate governance  activity 
 
1998  The Athens  Stock Exchange conducts a study  on corporate governance 
1999,  April OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 
1999,  October Corporate governance code (voluntary) by the Committee on Corporate 
Governance in Greece (under the coordination of the Capital  Market 
Commission) 
2000  The Ministries of National Economy  and  Development set  up a lawmaking 
committee on corporate governance (Rokkas  Committee) 
2000,  July Capital  Market Commission rule: ‘‘Tender offers in the capital market  for the 
acquisition of securities’’ (CMC Rule 1/195/2000) 
2000,  November Capital Market Commission rule: ‘‘A code of conduct for companies listed in the 
Athens  Stock Exchange and  their affiliated persons’’ (CMC Rule 5/204/2000) 
2001,  August  Principles of Corporate Governance by the Federation of Greek Industries 
2002,  March  A corporate governance rating system is presented by the Center  of Financial 
Studies of the University of Athens  (a project funded by the Athens  Stock 
Exchange) 
2002,  May Law 3016/2002: ‘‘On corporate governance, board remuneration and  other 
issues’’ 
2002,  July The Athens  Stock Exchange establishes qualitative  criteria covering corporate 
governance, transparency and communication with investors 
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structures, such as  board committees, directors’  independence and  qualifications, and  directors’ 
education, have not been adequately established. In this way, the board is mostly acting as a passive 
organ  in the company where it follows the decisions of the management. Non-executive board members, 
rather than  act  as  shareholders’ agents, do not efficiently supervise the management. This is the case in 
the majority of the (family) public  companies in Greece, where significant  costs result from bias  in favoring 
family interests over the firm’s interests (such as  non-family shareholders), because of loyalty toward  the 
family (Schulze et  al.,  2003).   Even  though the  rules  mandate  specific requirements  regarding  
board independence, it’s difficult in practice to identify whether  the board meets these rules.  The 
existence of efficient board structure and procedures is mostly a matter  of self-regulation. Listed 
companies have to realize that a well-functioned board is a comparative advantage in a  competitive 
business  world.  This implies  that  the  main  challenge for the  family-owned  listed firms is to re-examine 
their CG policy, to adopt contemporary standards and to make a good trade-off between the agency costs 
of the private firm and that of the widely held public firm. 
 
But why really should  we expect family-owned  firms to pursue corporate governance and to buy it? Better 
access to capital  is the most commonly  given reason. When investors refuse to put their funds in bad-
governed companies, the cost of capital  for such companies goes up, making  them  uncompetitive. But 
firms can  obtain  external  financing in a number of ways besides issuing  shares to the public.  However, 
corporate governance may still meet  one of the most  significant challenges that family-run businesses 
face:  management succession. As  the  business grows   and   markets  evolve,   finding  sufficient   
managerial  talent   and experience within the family becomes harder. Families need corporate 
governance both to operate the business and to promote  family harmony. This means putting in place 
open and  fair decision-making and   monitoring  procedures, as  well as  possibly hiring  non-family 
members as  advisors, managers and  directors (Zafft, 2003). 
 
In addition, the role of institutional investors has  to be  re-examined. In Greece, institutional investors 
usually follow a passive voting for management and  they rarely provide  sufficient information   for  their  
investment  policy  to  beneficiaries.  Institutional  investors need  to re-examine their  strategy and   
focus   on  well-governed companies.  Full disclosure and  comprehensive  explanation of  their  voting  
policies  to their  beneficiaries will help  in this direction. 
 
Political forces that set  the rules  have  also  affected the developments of CG in Greece. In continental 
European countries and in Greece too, employment protection is high, in a sense that the State is charged 
with the task of sustaining a social pact between social parties. The market  for corporate control,  
however,  cannot efficiently operate when  a  new  controlling shareholder is  unable to  break up  
employment contacts.  In this  way,  the  frequency of corporate control change (through take-overs) is 
negatively correlated with the degree of employment protection (Shleifer  and  Summers, 1988;  Pagano 
and  Volpin,  2002).  Hence, significant  policy  implications emerge,  such as  many  stated-owned 
companies that  are privatized through  public  offerings  of shares in Greece. 
 
An efficient  CG  regime  may  prove  to be  a  significant  policy  tool for the  investment and  growth 
prospective of the Greek  economy. The regulatory framework  of the Greek  capital  market has been fully 
co-ordinate with the EU standards. The challenge is now mostly for the business world  to react and  
voluntarily adopt the  appropriate CG  structures, in order  to achieve real convergence with the 
business systems of the developed world. 
 
 
Notes 
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1.  The Stability and  Growth Pact  adopted by the European Council at Amsterdam in June 1007. 
 
2.  Greece has cut its budget deficit below 1.5 percent of GDP (from 7.4 in 1996) and reduced inflation 
below 4 percent (from 7.9 percent in 1996). However, inflation continued to be  higher  than the EU 
average and  decelerated only slightly during  2003. Debt continued to deescalate and  is expected to be,  
at the end  of the year 2003,  at about 101.7  percent of GDP (from 111.3  in 1996). 
 
3.  The Opacity Index (high numbers indicate a high degree of opacity  and low numbers indicate a low 
degree of opacity)  offers a composite factor ranking for each country, based on opacity  data in the 
following  five  areas that  affect  capital   markets:  corruption in  government bureaucracy;  laws 
governing  contracts or  property   rights;  economic policies   (fiscal,  monetary, and  tax-related); 
accounting standards; and  business regulations. 
4.  Privatization proceeds in 2002 reached e2.7 billion, thus topping the list of EU countries (as a ratio to 
GDP).  Approximately  the same amount  has  been raised during  the January to October period in 2003.  
These proceeds have  been mainly used for the reduction of the general government debt. 
 
5.  The amendment of corporate law opened a huge controversy between the representatives of the 
industrial  federations and  the state. 
6.  Greece is rated better than  Belgium, Italy, Germany, but worse  than  France, Spain,  Portugal  and  
others. 
7.  For  example, to  make   amendments to  the  company’s articles   of  association,  to  elect   board 
members, to appoint statutory auditors and  to approve the annual  accounts and  dividends. 
8.  These exceptional rights include  preferential  payment of the first dividend, preferential  repayment of the 
contribution in the case of liquidation and  the right to collect a cumulative dividend for financial years 
during  which no dividend was declared. 
9.  During their tenure, the independent non-executive board members are not allowed  to own more than  
0.5  percent of the  company’s share capital  and  to  have  a  relation  of dependence with the corporation 
or persons associated with it. 
10.   The  HCMC is  endowed with the  authority  to  impose administrative  sanctions (suspension and  
revocation of license, trading halts, imposition of fines) on all supervised legal and  physical entities that  
violate  capital   market  law  and   the  rules.  It is  also  endowed with the  authority  to  submit indictments 
to prosecution authorities when punishable financial law violations are detected. 
11.   The  first speculative bubble took  place in Holland  from  1620  to  1637  and  involved  rare  and  
collectible tulips. Since then, it is well known the speculative short life of the South Sea  Company in 
England (1711-1720),  the  Florida  real  estate craze (1924-1926),  the  speculative bubble during 1926-
1929  in the US stocks, the ‘‘tronics’’ stocks (1962) and  the crash of 1987 (Galbraith, 1993). 
 
12.   Premiums averaged 12-14  percent in North America  and  Western  Europe, 20-25  percent in Asia and  
Latin America,  and  over 30 percent in Eastern Europe and  Africa. 
13.   The adoption of the  criteria  is at the  discretion of the  listed  companies, without prejudice to the 
existing  legal requirements relating  to corporate governance. 
14.   Approximately  15  per  cent  of the  firms  in the  initial sample did  not  respond  either  because of 
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changes in their structure (M&As), reluctance to be part of the exercise, or simple  lack of time. 
15.   In order to achieve the highest possible consensus and obtain market-oriented outcomes, a Special 
Advisory  Committee on  Corporate Governance was  convened consisting of members of all the 
relevant agents of the Greek market  to advise the researchers on practical matters related to their work. 
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